


TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION



Selected Papers from a Student Conference on Collaborations across Space and Time

Edited by Huda Alawa and Stefanie M. Schuster



**bavarian
american academy**



**LASKY CENTER
FOR TRANSATLANTIC STUDIES**

„Programm für bessere Studienbedingungen und mehr Qualität in der Lehre.“ Sponsored by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) (grant no 01PL17016). Any opinions expressed here are those of the author.

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Conference Program

10:30	Registration and Coffee
11:00	<p>Welcome Conference Organizers Luis Groitl & Stefanie Schuster</p> <p>Bavarian American Academy Dr. Margaratha Schweiger-Wilhelm</p> <p>Keynote Address: Americanists in Unexpected Places Professor George Blaustein (Amsterdam) What is American Studies? — and where? This lecture offers a centrifugal history of a centrifugal field: American Studies' several origins and sundry fates. It presents episodes from a far-flung Americanist century, with stops in the United States, Europe, and Japan, from the 1910s through the cold war. In different national contexts, American Studies could be area studies, enemy studies, idol studies, collective narcissism, or collective projection. Fascism, war, military occupation, and postwar reconstruction have shaped the Americanist endeavor in surprising ways. It is a commonplace that "American exceptionalism" was the field's foundation, but that phrase does not necessarily mean what we think it means, and a broader historical canvas reveals other histories of American uniqueness. Considering the hidden histories of the field may in turn illuminate how to be Americanists after the American Century.</p>
12:30-13:30	Lunch for Conference Participants
13:30-15:00	<p>Student Panel I: Transatlantic Encounters in the post-World War II World Chair: Ina Brechenmacher (Munich) Comment by: Katharina Gerund (Erlangen-Nürnberg)</p> <p>A for Ausländer: Scarlet Letter or Badge of Exceptionality: Import Regulations in German American Football Kate Sherman</p> <p>From Milk Bars to Starbucks and McDonalds: American Influences on British Youth Culture Simone Linz</p> <p>Creating Frenemies from Friends: A Look at How the Cold War Order has had a Lasting Impact in the Post – Cold War Era on Relations between the United States and the European Union Victoria Salemme</p>

15:00-15:30	Coffee Break
15:30-17:00	<p>Student Panel II: Challenging the Boundaries of the Transatlantic Chair: Sakina Groeppmaier (Munich) Comment by: Charlotte Lerg (Munich)</p> <p>Eden, Eisenhower and the Suez Canal Crisis: The Struggle for International Public Opinion Megan Bosence</p> <p>Atlantic Axes: Testing Transatlantic Cooperation within the U.S.-EU-Cuba Triangle Stefanie Schuster</p> <p>Narratives of the Arctic during the Cold War Ina Brechenmacher</p>
17:00-17:15	Short Break
17:15-18:30	<p>Roundtable Discussion: Transatlantic Cooperation across Space and Time Chair: Andreas Etges</p> <div> George Blaustein Catherina Kaiser </div> <div> Stephen Ibelli Andrea Rotter </div>

Organizer's Note

The idea to bring together students from across Bavaria for a conference on Transatlantic Relations came from a desire to respond to the perception of an increasingly unstable transatlantic partnership. To accomplish this goal, the conference attempted to investigate how cooperation across the Atlantic has functioned through asking how cooperative frameworks have shifted in the contemporary political stage and how transatlantic partnerships can be understood in more complex ways.

Taking an interdisciplinary approach allows a holistic perspective to illustrate the political, economic, historical, and cultural elements. This reflects the nature of American Studies, which cross-cuts disciplines to gain a nuanced understanding of America's global position.

Complementing the Bavarian American Academy (BAA) Annual Conference's discussion on Transatlantic Perspectives, the student conference provided an invaluable opportunity for students to workshop and present their unique research at a day-long conference hosted at by Amerikahaus in Munich. This event would not have been possible without the support of the people and institutions who worked to realize our vision. Many thanks go to Lehre@LMU, the BAA, Dr. Margaretha Schweiger-Wilhelm and her team at the Amerikahaus, the Amerika Institut and the wonderful faculty there.

Thank you to Dr. G.H. Blaustein, who provided a thought-provoking keynote speech, the conference chairs who dedicated their time to moderate the conference sessions, and the participants who shared the afternoon with us. Such a conference would be nothing were it not for the presenters, who contributed their projects in a thought-invoking manner.

This conference volume proudly presents the outcome of this project. Many thanks to PD Dr. Charlotte Lerg, for her constant guidance and support, as well as to the Lasky Center for Transatlantic Studies which enabled this publication, providing student presenters a rare opportunity to share their work. Thank you, dear contributors, for sharing the papers in this contribution. Special thanks go to our editor, Huda Alawa, who has done a fantastic job.

This publication is the reflection of an enlightening conference, bringing together a variety of perspectives to create a more cohesive discourse on transatlantic cooperation across space and time.

Stefanie M. Schuster



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A Note from the Keynote Speaker

The conference was well-timed for an era of temporal confusion. The term “post-Cold War” illustrates the predicament. What is, was, and wasn’t the Cold War? And what should we call our own era? The conference’s closing roundtable, for me at least, brought home the urgency and the challenge of these questions.

The papers were consistently well-wrought and charted several geographies of American Studies as a field. Megan Bosence charted reactions to the Suez Crisis; Victoria Salemme pondered motifs of transatlantic friendship and frenemyship.

The transatlantic frame was bent toward less familiar regions, too. A Cuban vantage, Stefanie Schuster revealed, illuminates the politics of both the US and the EU. The Arctic, Ina Brechenmacher showed, is a site of both geopolitical contest and mythic projection.

It was a day of vivid details, from Simone Linz on young Brits and their American tastes, to Kate Sherman’s investigation of the curiously Hawthornean “A” worn by international athletes playing American football in Germany.

In my lecture, I narrated some of American Studies’ more hidden histories in Europe and Japan. It is a dusty subject, but it set the stage for the conference participants’ far less dusty contributions. I was honored to participate.

Dr. G.H. (George) Blaustein
University of Amsterdam

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Eden, Eisenhower, and the Suez Canal Crisis: The Struggle for International Public Opinion

Megan Leigh Bosence

Introduction

There can be no peace – without law. And there can be no law – if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us – and another for our friends.¹

- Dwight D. Eisenhower, October 31, 1956

The Suez Crisis of 1956 profoundly altered the course of world power within the Middle East, and changed the course of Washington's foreign policy for the future. The event solidified the United States power within the region, marking the first time a major outside power became implemented within the Middle East, replacing former colonial powers, Britain and France.² For the Anglo-French governments, their political influence before the crisis appeared weak, but still functional as part of the "Big Four" within the international context. However, Suez provided a spotlight on their increasing political powerlessness, economic fragility, and dependence upon the United States to protect Western interests as the emerging superpower.

For many scholars, the Suez Crisis of 1956 represents one of the most significant episodes in United States and British foreign policy since the end of World War II. The crisis was not only the humiliating end of imperial influence for Britain and France, but an event that marked the United States surpassing its European partners as a prominent power in the Middle East. It also demonstrated the ability of the United States to act against anyone, even their closest allies, when it came to supporting its overall strategy of containment during the Cold War. This would have a lasting impact on international relations into the present day. Through personal correspondence, pivotal addresses from leaders and public reaction during the crisis, this paper highlights the shifting ideologies within the Anglo-American relationship during the height of the Suez Crisis in 1956. While stressing the importance of public addresses, this paper will discuss the outcome

¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley," The American Presidency Project, 1956, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233787>.

² Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shemesh, *The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal*, (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Frank Class and Company limited, 1990), 189.

of the Suez Crisis and how international public opinion would determine the future of both Anthony Eden and Dwight Eisenhower's political careers. Ultimately, this paper argues the importance of speech rhetoric between the United States President and British Prime Minister within the Suez Canal Crisis and the role it played for winning over international public opinion.

This paper begins by reviewing the historical context of the crisis while outlining the basic factors which sparked hostilities between the Egyptian government and created conflict between the Eden and Eisenhower administrations. The next section assesses the special relationship between the Anglo-American leaders, while analyzing their differing mentalities towards the crisis, as well as personal correspondence leading up to the war. The third section analyzes the October 31, 1956 speeches of Eden and Eisenhower, focusing especially on how the Anglo-American leaders presented their differences to the public and why one was more successful in rallying international opinion. From here, the public reaction to the crisis will be assessed, as this ultimately created a great divide between the British political parties and the press. The concluding section illustrates the importance of Eden and Eisenhower's Anglo-American relationship and how the crisis changed the course of the future for international influence, while reiterating the importance of public opinion within the Suez Crisis.

While numerous historians, diplomats, and political scientists have commented upon the lessons and outcomes of the Suez Crisis, this event has received relatively little attention within the field of rhetoric and the importance of public opinion. In fact, few studies have rigorously analyzed Eden and Eisenhower's speeches and media coverage within the crisis. Therefore, the selection of speeches are essential in illustrating the complex relationship between these two leaders and their differences while addressing the public, and in defining how each nation took their own path in dealing with the Suez controversy. In exploring the relationship and rhetoric between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden during the crisis, this paper also relies on personal correspondence and newspaper articles as additional primary sources. These newspaper articles aim to demonstrate how the press was reporting on the crisis before and after the war broke out. By focusing on the relationship between Eden, Eisenhower and their political rhetoric, this paper begins to define how the events of the Suez Crisis were influenced by personal, as well as national interests in the region.

Historical Context

Prior to delving into the Suez Crisis of 1956, it is important to understand the complex history that has created the context for the political situation within the Anglo-American relationship. In 1954, two years before the crisis, President Gamal Abdul Nasser, head of the new government in Egypt, had successfully negotiated with the British to end colonial military presence and began to look forward to securing Egypt's future in a post-colonial world. However, it was not long before a number of issues created tension between Egypt and the interested Western powers, namely Britain, France, and the United States. As an example, Nasser agreed to a \$200 million dollar arms deal with the communist Soviet Union in September 1955 after the United States and British government denied military assistance.³ This purchase of the huge quantity of Soviet arms shocked the West, as it was seen as a major affirmation of Soviet influence in the region. These actions caused the United States and Britain to eventually cancel their offer to finance the Aswan Dam, which was aimed to help build Egypt's economy. After the United States and Britain withdrew their promised funding, President Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956, which would become the main case of the Suez Crisis. Immediately after nationalization, there was widespread support for military action among the British people despite the fact that the Suez Canal was within Egyptian territory.

The canal is positioned in a strategic location, allowing for passage between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea by creating a shorter access between Europe and Asia. As a result, the Suez Canal is the central line of transport, connecting the three continents for the movement of goods and significantly oil. While Egypt maintained the canal and its deliveries to the European powers after nationalization in July, Britain and France feared that Nasser might close the canal and cut off shipments of petroleum, which accounted for two thirds of Europe's oil.⁴ Accordingly, an alliance was quickly formed between Britain, France, and Israel with plans to invade Egypt in order to recover the Canal and remove Nasser from power.

Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal had implications for countries across the western world. The United States government had concerns that the invasion would

³ Ibid., 191.

⁴ Troen and Shemesh. *The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956*, 4.

draw support for the Soviet Union in Egypt and the Middle East, resulting in the eventual hand over of the Suez Canal to the Soviets, which the American government wanted to avoid. It became clear that Nasser's actions constituted an explicit response to the withdrawal of the American financial support for the Aswan High Dam Hydroelectric Project.⁵ Therefore, Nasser's move had a Cold War rationale, pertaining to which superpower patron Egypt would turn to for arms and aid. Britain and France's possible responses to nationalization were thus constrained by this Cold War context.⁶ As a result, President Eisenhower's primary reason for getting involved was to prevent the region's resources from falling into the hands of the Soviet Union, and to do so Eisenhower knew the United States had to win the battle for world opinion to prevent such a scenario from unfolding.

On the British side, containment was also a concern, their main objective was to personally secure the movement of oil and resources detrimental to the European economy.⁷ A skilled diplomat, Prime Minister Eden was much more flexible in his approach to the decolonization of Egypt than his mentor, Winston Churchill. Having lost two brothers and a son to war, he was regarded as committed man of peace and was seen as someone who could navigate a crisis situation without personal involvement.⁸ However, this proved false once the Suez Crisis began to develop, and Eden became preoccupied with maintaining Britain's great power status within the region as a result of the nationalization of the canal. This contributed to jeopardizing his public image and political relationship towards the United States in the events to come.

The struggle for Anglo-American unity would become apparent while dealing with the aftermath of the Suez nationalization. Although this situation created a mutual standpoint for the United States and British government, according to Eisenhower, Egypt's seizure of the canal was considered insufficient grounds for military involvement and only a clear sign of obstruction would permit the use of force. By contrast, European leaders viewed nationalization of the region as sufficient grounds for required military

⁵ David M. McCourt, *Configurations: Critical Studies of World Politics: Britain and World Power since 1945: Constructing a Nation's Role in International Politics*, (University of Michigan Press, 2014), 60.

⁶ Ibid., 60.

⁷ Ibid., 60.

⁸ Philip Zelikow, Ernest R. May, and The Harvard Suez Team, *Suez Deconstructed: An Interactive Study in Crisis, War and Peacemaking*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C., 2018), 71.

action.⁹ This fundamental disagreement set the pattern for the Suez interaction as it progressed. The United States faced a difficult balancing act in the crisis, as they were required to provide moral and diplomatic support for its allies, but also restrain Britain and France from engaging in military action. Therefore, the United States took on the role of the alliance leader of international peace and security.¹⁰ This set the stage for the transition of international power within the region and allowed the United States to take a neutral stance within the crisis during the struggle for international peace.

The Relationship Between Eden and Eisenhower

Before the Suez Crisis escalated, the mutual standpoint of the United States and British governments provided the ability to resolve conflicts of interest between them. Both countries were led by a conservative leader and administration. Eden and Eisenhower had made a reputation for themselves as having extensive wartime experience, consistently battling for peace. Unexpectedly, the United States and Britain failed to manage this conflict, which was surprising when one considers the closeness of ties between the two countries.

The Anglo-American relations have historically been close, in fact so close that the term “special relationship” has been coined and applied ever since the end of World War II in 1945.¹¹ The relationship is termed special because of the extent of cooperation in particular areas of politics and the range of deep ties between the two, forged through close wartime collaboration, shared language and experiences continuing into the post-war era. The point then, is that although the Anglo-American relationship remains in certain respects special, the larger international realities fundamentally changed when the crisis broke out and each leader assumed the other would align their government through the decision making process.¹² The Prime Minister believed that in conjunction with the Americans, he could widen support against Nasser, pressing him to relinquish his control of the Canal.¹³ This is seen when analyzing the personal correspondence and records of the Eden and Eisenhower relationship.

⁹ McCourt, *Configurations*, 60.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 71.

¹¹ Louise Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crisis*, (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1996), 3.

¹² David Reynolds, “A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War,” *International Affairs* 62: no.1 (Winter 1985-86): 16.

¹³ Jonathan Pearson, *Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 177.

Correspondence between Eden and Eisenhower depicts a personal side to the United States and British relationship, reinstating the Anglo-American special relationship not only on a political level, but an individual one as well. During the Suez Crisis, before the war broke out, we are able to see a friendlier side of the leaders toward each other. This affirms that although allies differed during this crisis, the Anglo-American leaders relied heavily on one another to keep balance during the Cold War period.

The Eisenhower administration remained noncommittal on the specific scenarios that might unfold. In a July 31 correspondence to Eden, President Eisenhower “recognized the transcendent worth of the Canal to the free world and the possibility that eventually the use of force might be necessary in order to protect international rights.”¹⁴ However, he then insisted and emphasized the need for a conference method to be instated before any military force could be considered because “public opinion here and, I am convinced, in most of the world, would be outraged.”¹⁵

Two weeks prior to the Suez invasion by Britain and the US, Eisenhower wrote to Eden and expressed his personal feeling on the upcoming United States election, as well as the current problems in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. In this communication, he maintained a friendly rhetoric to oppose any tensions that might be brewing during the crisis between United States and Britain that month:

I am always grateful for the understanding you have of our problems - and I know that nothing can ever seriously mar either our personal friendship or the respect that our government and peoples have for each other.¹⁶

Although Eden and Eisenhower attempted to maintain a neutral tone, there seem to be a few moments of contention between the two countries and their leaders. One of the main points of contention between the United States and Britain was the issue of colonialism that ran through European history and was implemented within the motivations of Britain during the Suez Crisis. Anthony Eden, like Winston Churchill, was from a generation which took great pride in the history of the British Empire and its prosperity. However,

¹⁴ Peter G. Boyle, *The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955-1957*, (The University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill and London, 2005), 156.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 175.

Dwight Eisenhower, like most Americans, took a different view and assumed that many countries under the British Empire would become independent in the near future.

The undeclared war on Egypt started on October 28, with British bombers launching their assault a couple of days later. Eden immediately faced a barrage of criticism in Parliament, from the Eisenhower administration, and in the UN, where the government was forced to use Britain's veto for the first time.¹⁷ Although Eden's government tried to distance themselves by consistently denying colonialist intentions during the crisis, it was the subject that many politicians and journalist focused on during their criticisms of the British government. On October 30, 1956, Eden reassured Eisenhower that any action they took was not part of a reversal to old Colonial concepts, which is an impression the British Government were anxious to avoid.¹⁸ These events took place six days prior to the United States 1956 presidential election, creating a deeper concern for Eisenhower as bombs fell on Cairo and Soviet soldiers rounded up Hungarian protesters. Eden and Eisenhower went before their respective countries, addressing them on a national and international level.¹⁹

United States and Britain Addresses the Crisis

To analyze each of the speeches delivered by Eden and Eisenhower on October 3rd, 1956, Martin J. Medhurst's theories of speech rhetoric and writing are employed. Medhurst mentions that "Cold War weapons" of "words, images, [and] symbolic actions" were indeed employed by both leaders, and goes on to describe how the primary aim of Cold War rhetoric was to improve each nation's strategic position without resorting to military force.²⁰ This provided one of the main strengths President Eisenhower wielded while reporting to the public during the Suez Crisis.

For most of American history, United States presidents virtually ignored the Middle East. Eisenhower, however, developed a policy and delivered a speech, which oriented the presidency toward this region in new ways. As an example, Eisenhower not only sought to distance America from its allies, but he used this speech, and the crisis it addressed, to make an argument for why America should displace them as the regional

¹⁷ Ibid., 336.

¹⁸ Ibid., 181.

¹⁹ Randall Fowler, "Lion's Last Roar, Eagle's First Flight: Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 20: no. 1 (2017): 34.

²⁰ Martin J. Medhurst, "*Rhetoric and Cold War: A Strategic Approach*," *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, rev. ed. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 19–20.

hegemon.²¹ This marked one of the first times in history that an American President made a comprehensive case for United States involvement in the Middle East, and it was uniquely fitted to them because they alone could hold the responsibility to safeguard and maintain order independently of other powers.²² The Suez Crisis and President Eisenhower's speech responding to the situation signify a rhetorical pivot reflecting the transition from British dominance to American ascendancy in the Middle East. By explaining the crisis to the American public in the way he did, Eisenhower rearticulated the basis for American involvement in the region.²³

Prime Minister Eden, on the other hand, had the task of convincing his party, the House, the British public, and the world towards the military involvement in the Suez Canal zone and articulating that throughout his address. As a post-colonial power within the region, Britain's interests in the invasion were met with skepticism and viewed as a personal vendetta against the Egyptian President. Instead of calming the situation, Eden's rhetoric throughout the address suggests the need to bolster, pressure, and inspire followers towards his actions.²⁴ Therefore, the Prime Minister utilizes a personal call to war speech, as opposed to a neutral address.

Upon comparing the two speeches, Eden's speech aims to legitimize British involvement, state the national interest in the region, and insist that force was needed to stabilize the situation and maintain peace. Eisenhower, on the other hand, attempts to balance America's need to reassure its allies while appealing to anti-colonial neutral nations. Eisenhower accomplished this by assuming the guise of a reporter, removing himself from the text and speaking as a third party, as though disconnected from the events taking place.²⁵ An example of this can be found in the opening statement: "My Fellow Americans: Tonight I report to you as your President..."²⁶ In contrast to this, Eden's address has a clear personal touch, and in doing so his commitment for peace was somewhat diminished in comparison to Eisenhower's position.

²¹ Eisenhower, 1956.

²² Fowler, "Lion's Last Roar, Eagle's First Flight," 35.

²³ Ibid., 34.

²⁴ Anthony Eden, "Speech by Anthony Eden. First session of the forty-fifth Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland," Speech, Britain, October 31, 1956, <https://www.cvce.eu/s/el>.

²⁵ Fowler, "Lion's Last Roar, Eagle's First Flight," 41.

²⁶ Eisenhower, 1956.

Eisenhower argues that the Egyptians behaved out of irrational aggression and reacted to colonial actions in which America was uninvolved. The speech shows that Eisenhower did not wish to alienate the newly independent Arab nations by blatantly siding with Britain and France. At the same time, he did not want to weaken or strain relations with America's primary allies, as doing so would not only require a great investment of American resources to prevent the spread of communism, but also obliterate any chance of a united European diplomatic and military front against the Soviet Union, which was so vital to containment. Eisenhower alludes to the fact that Britain, France, and Israel could not be trusted because they acted outside leadership of the United States. Therefore, Eisenhower sympathetically paints all three allied nations as acting out of "anxiety" and "fear" for their interests, where the United States could play a neutral power. Lastly, the American president expresses America's neutrality as its main strength in the situation. For example, where the Soviets sought domination, America wanted freedom; where Egypt acted out of aggressive immaturity, America suggested negotiation; and while Britain, France and Israel managed their power irresponsibly, America pursued the interests of the entire world.²⁷

In both speeches, it is apparent where the United States and Britain both collide and separate their national values. This is important when analyzing the strength of the Anglo-American relationship but is perhaps overshadowed by the standstill ending of both addresses. Prime Minister Eden ends his address by stating European independence and the conviction of achieving peace through force:

Now I wish to say something about our relations with the United States in the matter. The decisions which we and the French Government took were, as I said yesterday, taken on our own account and on our own responsibility. The Government remain convinced that we could have done no other and discharge our national duty. Now, it is, of course, an obvious truth that safety of transit through the Canal, though clearly of concern to the United States, is for them not a matter of survival as it is to us and, indeed, to all Europe and many other lands... If anyone says that on that account we should have held up action until agreement could be reached with the United States as to what to do I can only say that this would have been to ignore what everyone here and in the United States knows to have been different approaches to some of these vital Middle Eastern questions.²⁸

²⁷ Fowler, "Lion's Last Roar, Eagle's First Flight," 43.

²⁸ Eden, 1956.

President Eisenhower, on the other hand, assumes the role of a neutral power pursuing a peaceful solution for the entire world:

As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right – if our judgment so dictates – to dissent. We believe these actions to have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes... There can be no peace – without law. And there can be no law – if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us – and another for our friends.²⁹

In the end, having completely misread Eisenhower, Eden and the British government consequently found themselves in the position they least expected: in opposition to the United States and without the support of the western superpower.

Public Reaction

Following the speeches from Eisenhower and Eden on October 31, it became clear that not everyone agreed with Eden's approach to the crisis. This resulted in a major clash between British political parties and gave way to public protests during the first few days of the invasion. The division in Britain was seen in the political arena and the public sphere. In the House, the Conservative right wing strongly supported the military action and was critical of United Nations and United States efforts to force the withdrawal of British troops. In contrast, the Labour Party attacked the Government's foreign policy, bitterly opposing the use of British troops in Suez and endorsing a broad program of United Nations action. The Labour Party, together with the Trade Union Congress, was not only committed to opposing the war in the House, but also to waging a nationwide campaign to force the government to stop the invasion. The theme of the campaign was "Law Not War," and included mass meetings throughout the country.³⁰ Most notable among these demonstrations against continued military action was a Sunday afternoon meeting in Trafalgar Square, when nearly 30,000 demonstrators, fired by a speech of Nye Bevan tried to smash their way through the police cordons in front of 10 Downing Street.³¹ Protests were scattered with people brandishing signs that read "Law not War," echoing Eisenhower's words just a few days prior.

²⁹ Eisenhower, 1956.

³⁰ Khalid Mahmood, "British Public Opinion and Suez," *Pakistan Horizon* 15, No. 3 (Third Quarter, 1962): 207.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 217.

Within the public sphere, Eden's actions and political rhetoric profoundly shocked vast numbers of people, including a massive section of his own middle class supporters. Private individuals formed action committees all over the country, held meetings, distributed leaflets and stucco posters, while angry telegrams flowed into Downing Street.³² This clear divide within the House, the newspapers, and the British public opinion was something that the British government anticipated but did not fully comprehend until the invasion was in progress.

Public opinion in Britain was also influenced by many national morning papers and opinions were split almost evenly along political party preferences. As an example of the division, four papers usually sympathetic to the Conservative cause, with a combined circulation of 8,313,357 subscribers, were pro-Suez. Three others, one Liberal and two Labour, boasting a combined circulation of 7,745,131 households, were anti-Suez.³³ While *The Times* was mostly neutral, *The Conservative Sunday Times* and *Beaverbrook's Daily Express* were pro-Suez. *The Liberal* independents, *the Observer*, *the Manchester Guardian*, *the Daily Mirror*, *Daily Herald*, *News Chronicle* and *the Guardian*, the consistent opponents of military intervention, were vigorously anti-Suez.³⁴ American reporting networks, such as the *New York Times*, updated American readers on the British opinion during the months leading up to the invasion, as it was one of the main sources of authority regarding public opinion within the events. Some of the headlines include, "Eden Says Nasser is the Sole Enemy in Crisis on Suez"³⁵ and "Eden Talk Fails to Unify British Parliament and the Press Even Further Divided Over Suez Statement."³⁶ Americans had the freedom to express their concerns and criticize the British government during the months of decision making, whereas the British press did not have that option to the full extent.

Censorship of the British press during the crisis was strict under Eden's government and therefore limited the ability of public opinion. Eden attempted to censor the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) from reporting in a neutral, objective

³² Ibid., 216.

³³ Ibid., 220.

³⁴ Ibid., 220.

³⁵ Kennett Love, "Eden Says Nasser is the Sole Enemy in Crisis on Suez," *New York Times*, August 9, 1956, 1.

³⁶ Thomas P. Ronan, "Eden Talk Fails to Unify British Parliament and the Press Even Further Divided Over Suez Statement," *New York Times*, September 13, 1956, 9.

manner, therefore leaving no room to criticize Eden's government. However, Eden was unsuccessful in his attempts to ban the BBC from publishing the Guardian's diplomatic correspondent, Richard Scott, whose paper was critical of Eden's policy.³⁷ The ability of the BBC to resist Eden's demands, indicating a shift in the balance of power. In the aftermath, Eden's competence to govern would be increasingly questioned by the press seeking a niche for itself in the wake of falling circulation and advertising revenues, helping to create an environment for an even more critical era to follow.³⁸ These unmistakable signs of drift and indecision within the western alliance had an inevitable effect on British public opinion.

Through analyzing the British and American press releases, it becomes apparent see how reports of public opinion shaped the future of the Suez Crisis and the Anglo-American relationship in regards to foreign relations and international influence. In Eden's case, public opinion turned negative once implications regarding the colonial motivations and ill advised use of military action were made. For Eisenhower, public opinion was the exact opposite. In America, Eisenhower saw a celebrated reelection, signifying high approval. This was also apparent in Britain, where Eden's protesters brandished signs containing words from the American president's speech. Ultimately, the differing public opinions toward both leaders would result in the end of one career, and the flourishing of the other.

Conclusion

In the end, it appeared that the British and French invasion might have actually been successful, but what the allies did not count on was the alliance between the United States government and the Soviet Union against the Anglo-French decision to invade Egypt. With Soviet control being threatened in both Eastern Europe and the Middle East, its reaction was to threaten nuclear warfare on Britain and France if the allies did not retreat.

For Britain and France, the political support at home and internationally was divided in response to the Suez Crisis, specifically towards the use of military force. When Britain's financial reserves were in danger by November 4, it became clear the United States was needed to assist them from an impending financial crisis. Eisenhower used this to his advantage and refused to allow the International Monetary Fund to provide

³⁷ Mick Temple, *The British Press*, (McGraw Hill Open University Press, 1996), 60.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 60.

emergency loans to Britain unless the government called off the invasion. Facing a financial collapse, on November 6, nine days after Israeli troops had invaded Egypt, and six days after his public address, Eden surrendered to American demands and halted the operation. His resignation from office would follow just a few months later.

The Suez Crisis impacted the various nations involved in differing ways. For Britain and France, it decreased their standing as global powers, and highlighted their economic fragility and dependence upon the United States to protect western interests. For Egypt and other Arab states, the crisis served as a huge victory for the small Arab nation against two colonial powers. For Israel, Suez resulted in access to the Red Sea, and signified the need to develop closer ties with the United States.

For the United States, the Suez Crisis was an event that marked the country surpassing its European partners as a prominent power in the region. The speech that Eisenhower gave in October also laid the groundwork for the “Eisenhower Doctrine,” which would be delivered in January 1957, soon after the celebration of his reelection. The Doctrine would authorize the United States, independent of the UN, to assist any nation in the Middle East with economic or military aid if they were threatened by any form of Communist aggression. This changed US foreign policy while implementing themselves into Middle Eastern affairs for the future.

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From Milk Bars to Starbucks and McDonalds: American Influences on British Youth Culture

Simone Linz

Introduction

Towards the end of the Second World War, American values and attitudes had made their way into British culture, greatly influencing British society.¹ However, according to Howard L. Malchow, even the cityscape of London has changed after the war when “streets of surviving Victorian and Georgian buildings were swept away for new traffic schemes, office building slabs, and the odd high-rise tower.”² The whole city became more modern and office buildings, large parking lots and big shopping centers emerged even in smaller British cities. This modernization process has been seen as an example of the expansion of American culture in Europe by many British citizens.³

American culture also influenced British youth culture, developing between the two world wars. Teenager have been described to be young people between the age of fifteen to twenty-five who were not married yet and who still had to learn how to assume responsibilities like adults. This period saw the emergence of the teenage consumer: young adults who suddenly had money on hand to spend on leisure activities.⁴ This resulted in the development of youth culture, which was both created by and for young people. In the beginning, the members of British youth culture were mainly university students and young people who belonged to the upper middle-class and therefore had money to spend on music, cinema visits and travelling.⁵ At the end of the 1950s, youth culture had already “lost its link with the Universities” and was not “the organic movement it started life as during the 1920s” anymore, but was instead “seen as closely linked with the burgeoning American pop culture industry.”⁶ It is important to note that during this time period, youth culture was strongly male dominated, which is why this paper concentrates on young men.

¹ Howard L. Malchow, *Special Relations: The Americanization of Britain?*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 1.

² Ibid., 27.

³ Ibid.

⁴ David Fowler, *Youth Culture in Modern Britain, c. 1920- c. 1970*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 115.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

Cultural studies scholar Richard Hoggart, author of *The Uses of Literacy* (1957) first mentioned British youth culture in the form of the Juke Box Boys, young males who spend their leisure time putting coins into juke boxes at milk bars in Northern English towns. His approach is of major importance for this paper as Hoggart was among the first scholars to criticize British youth culture for being under American influence.

This paper argues that it was especially the British youth who were drawn towards cultural elements from the United States. By giving an overview on possible American influences on British youth culture from Richard Hoggart's so-deemed "Juke Box Boy" from the late 1950s, to the formation of the Chavs in beginning of the twenty-first century, this paper examines the assumption that American culture did have a major impact on British youth culture during the post-war era and still strongly influences teenagers in Britain today. In order to do this, this paper draws upon the works of Richard Hoggart, Adrian Horn and Joe Moran, who write extensively on British youth culture and the American influence on the latter, even though they look at the phenomenon from different standpoints. Ultimately, this paper seeks to determine the influence of American culture on British youth culture today through a socio-historical perspective.

American Influence on British Youth Culture

In his book *Juke Box Britain*, author Adrian Horn examines how British attitudes towards Americans and American culture have changed from pre-war times to the 1960s, and how American culture influenced British youth culture during that period.

In the 1920s, American culture in Britain was limited to ragtime and jazz music, both of which were seen as a rebellion against "Victorian moral values and perceptions of 'respectability.'"⁷ Unsurprisingly, the main consumer group was the British youth who spent their leisure time dancing to the music of artists such as the Original Dixieland Band. This casual American music was a sharp contrast to the prudent and conservative attitude of the British middle class, which frowned upon this past time. The negative reception for so-called "proper" society was due to the predominately black American nature of jazz, prompting the genre to be labeled as a "savage" and "retrogressive

⁷ Adrian Horn, *Juke Box Britain*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 14.

evolutionary step for society.”⁸ This attitude was thus a result from the country’s past as a colonial power.⁹

During the Second World War, many American GIs were stationed in Britain. This became a point of fascination for British citizens, many of whom had never before met an American. Cultural differences quickly became apparent. While Americans complained about a lack of American media presence in Britain, many British were disappointed that the GIs were not interested in building relationships and friendships with the local population. Horn rationalizes that the soldiers, who had limited free time, did not want to spend these precious hours within the “social minefield of an English teatime.”¹⁰ Nevertheless, British citizens liked the American soldiers and GIs often helped harvesting crops on the fields of English farmers during their free time. The American population was especially positively received due to their economic contribution to the ailing British society, as GIs regularly passed their time at bars or in amusement parks.¹¹

Despite this, attitudes towards Americans were split across generation lines. Horn further observes that it was older generations of British people who expressed anti-American sentiments after the Second World War, and that for many of them, “the word ‘America’ became a metaphor for mass culture.”¹² The youth, on the other hand, adopted American cultural symbols enthusiastically. Nevertheless, Horn notes that American influence on British culture might have been overemphasized throughout the years and that even though Americanization played a great role, British culture itself should not be pushed into the background.¹³

Perhaps another reason for the positive reception by younger British citizens was the introduction of American technology in Britain. The American soldiers that lived in Britain during the war brought the first juke boxes to the country. In the beginning, juke boxes thus only existed inside military bases, meaning that only British people connected to American soldiers had the chance to listen to music on these devices. Up until 1954,

⁸ Ibid., 15.

⁹ Marc Matera, *Black London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonialization in the Twentieth Century*, (Oakland: U of California P, 2015), 148.

¹⁰ Horn, 21

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 3.

¹³ Ibid., 3-4

only a few juke boxes could be found in British bars. Due to large war debts, the British economy was too weak to import American goods.¹⁴ In an effort to expand into the British market, American technology company AMI decided to produce their juke boxes directly in Britain to elude British import restrictions.¹⁵ On June 6, 1959, the British market reopened for imports, paving the way for the importation of American juke boxes to the UK.¹⁶

By the mid-1900s, the British Broadcasting Channel (BBC) had established itself as a major player in the British entertainment industry. Rather than playing a wide array of music, however, the radio station limited its musical rapport in accordance to what it “perceived as ‘good music.’”¹⁷ In doing so, the BBC assumed a position of control in regulating and disseminating so-labeled “good” music, relying on wartime images of society. This invoked image of a conservative family seated around the table to listen to classical music.¹⁸ These efforts quickly limited its audience, so in an effort to gain the working class as its listeners, the BBC introduced the “Light Programme” in 1945. In contrast to the BBC’s other programs, the Light Programme was not limited to classical music, and included popular entertainment and music. This program quickly gained a wide audience, and soon became one of the radio stations most listened to in Britain.¹⁹

Juke boxes remained excluded by the general public, as large parts of society did not see the music played by juke boxes as “real music of cultural value.”²⁰ According to Adrian Horn, music was at the center of the “high culture/mass culture debate.”²¹ In this framing, the “magistrates, the police and the BBC”²² were defined as high culture, while youth – with their fascination of American music via juke boxes and the establishments that housed them – belonged to mass culture. The young men and women who went to jazz clubs on Saturday nights were referred to as “Be-Boppers,”²³ and were disliked by authorities and by most adults.

¹⁴ Ibid., 43.

¹⁵ Ibid., 50.

¹⁶ Ibid., 60.

¹⁷ Ibid., 67.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., 68.

²⁰ Ibid., 76.

²¹ Ibid., 75.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 69.

The mass culture genre, however, was American rock 'n roll music. The release of Bill Haley's song "Rock around the Clock" in 1955 and the homonymous movie released one year later marked the birth of rock 'n roll in Britain. The movie allegedly provoked "negative associations between rock' n' roll music and immoral and criminal behavior."²⁴ Such images were further reinforced with the rise of dance riots in cinemas, where young people would not stop dancing until many of them were arrested. In response to this, a large number of cinema owners to ban the movie.²⁵ Despite these measures, young people were inexorable, continuing to listen to juke boxes to gain access to the music they treasured. Unlike most British radio stations, juke boxes were uncensored and therefore they were the only source for young people to listen to rock' n' roll music. Overall, rock 'n' roll was seen as a form of rebellion for white teenagers in Britain, in the same way it had been accepted by the same American demographic.²⁶

American culture indeed had a strong influence on British youth culture. Despite this, British youth culture and teenagers were not simply American inventions. Horn claims that there is "compelling evidence"²⁷ that youth culture has had a long history in Britain, reaching back to the seventeenth century. The only new element of the British teen after the Second World War was that as a consumer: a characteristic that was perfectly compatible with the rise of American mass culture.²⁸

Richard Hoggart's Juke Box Boys

In his book, *The Uses of Literacy*, Richard Hoggart discusses the the culture of the British working class with a special focus on the influence of mass media.²⁹ Hoggart notes that most parts of the working class hold a positive view towards America and American culture. To this group, America is seen as a trailblazer, setting a cultural standard for British society.³⁰

Within his work, Hoggart creates a category of British working-class youth inspired by American culture. Termed the "Juke Box Boys," this group is described as young men "aged between fifteen and twenty years with drape-suits, picture ties and an

²⁴ Ibid., 78.

²⁵ Ibid., 79.

²⁶ Ibid., 82.

²⁷ Ibid., 90.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy*, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), 11.

³⁰ Ibid., 158.

American slouch, [whose] clothes, [...] hair-styles, [and] facial expressions all indicate [that] they are living to a large extent in a myth-world compounded of a few simple elements which they take to be those of American life.”³¹ Hoggart goes on further to describe this population as depressed young men who have “no aim, no ambition, no protection, no belief,” and who are mostly “less intelligent than the average.”³² The schools did not prepare them for those experiences directly following graduation. Their jobs are not demanding as they only have to use “their hands and a fraction of their brains for forty hours a week.”³³

To pass the time, Juke Box Boys regularly visited “harshly-lighted milk bars.”³⁴ Located in larger cities, these milk bars served as a meeting place for the youth. With limited income, Juke Box Boys were unable to afford milkshakes, instead opting for tea and spending their hours paying for music from the juke boxes. The songs Juke Box Boys listened to are mostly American, with an emphasis on vocals – a contrast to the programming found on the BBC.³⁵ While listening, “the young men waggle one shoulder or stare, as desperately as Humphrey Bogart, across the tubular chairs.”³⁶ To Hoggart, the Juke Box Boys are a negative omen for British society. This is especially emphasized in his harsh comparison of the Juke Box Boys to a “hedonistic but passive barbarian who rides in a fifty-horse-power bus for threepence [sic], to see a five-million-dollar film for one-and-eightpence.”³⁷

Hoggart further reflects upon the kind of literature the British youth reads and classifies his findings into three major groups: crime, science fiction, and sex novelettes.³⁸ He notes that magazines and books about crime are mainly from America, and while they should actually reduce crime, the focus is almost always on the criminal and therefore, the criminal is also the protagonist for the malleable young readers.³⁹ The titles of science fiction literature often include the words “space,” “future,” “astounding,” and “thrilling.”⁴⁰ The contents are similar, often involving girls outfitted in what Hoggart “sex

³¹ Ibid., 203-204.

³² Ibid., 204.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 203.

³⁵ Ibid., 203-204.

³⁶ Ibid., 204.

³⁷ Ibid., 205.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 206.

stuff,” such as zippered clothing instead of traditional feminine clothing.⁴¹ The sex novelettes are similar, containing crosswords, news and information about sports and celebrities and drawings, which Hoggart describes as “whimsical” rather than sexy.⁴² Hoggart’s criticism that these magazines and books only appear for “adolescents of below the average intelligence and for others who, for one reason or another, have not developed or do not feel themselves adequate”⁴³ draws upon a similar high/mass culture dichotomy to that discussed by Adrian Horn, with mass culture being viewed negatively.

Richard Hoggart’s words have been reason for debate across many studies. In his work on British youth culture, David Fowler sums up his interpretation of Hoggart’s *The Uses of Literacy*:

Hoggart’s point, it seems, was that these working-class youths of Northern towns were not creating their own culture. They were just ciphers for American pop music and, he argued, it dulled their brains. The young men who poured their money into the jukeboxes were like zombies.⁴⁴

Fowler thus criticizes Hoggart’s words as based on his independent prejudices, rather than fully entrenching himself in the culture. Throughout his research, Hoggart did not speak with any of the Juke Box Boys, despite having the opportunity to do so. He thus did not know anything about their families, their education, or socio-economic class. Fowler thus goes so far to question why Hoggart even included “this brief and rather alarmist account in his pioneering and path breaking survey of working-class culture.”⁴⁵ This reveals the difficulties of cultural research as well as the progress that has been made in this field since the 1960s.

From Milk Bars To Starbucks

Almost fifty years later, the question of how much, if at all, American culture has influenced British youth culture remains subject to discussion. In two papers released in 2005 and 2006, social and cultural historian Joe Moran critically examines Hoggart’s statement about milk bars as an American invention for the British youth. Countering this claim, Moran states that milk bars were in fact invented in Australia at the beginning of

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 208.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Fowler, *Youth Culture in Modern Britain*, 117.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

the 20th century and developed in Britain between the wars. Milk bars can be seen as an alternative to pubs and were, at the start, not created as an exclusive space for youth.⁴⁶ By the 1930s, British milk bars began to adopt the famous “streamlined, curvilinear design” of American milk bars and diners.⁴⁷ While Moran demonstrates that the change of the interior design mostly happened due to hygienic reasons, Hoggart interpreted this as a takeover of American culture.⁴⁸ In fact, Moran goes further in his explanation, noting that if milk bars were purely American-inspired, they would not have been as successful as there was still a predominantly negative sentiment towards American culture at the time.

Moran argues that American-inspired milk bars and diners indeed opened in great numbers and goes on to demonstrate the consecutive rise of Italian espresso bars spread across Britain. The espresso bars were also “seen as a foreign invasion, a mix of American kitsch and Continental pretension,” just like the “recent Starbuckisation of the high street.”⁴⁹ Primarily in West London, these spaces became a hotspot for the slightly sophisticated – that is, for students and young women who were looking for alternatives to male-dominated bars and pubs.⁵⁰

Today, there is a modern-day equivalent to the former milk bars and espresso bars which began to close in the late 1970s: coffee chains such as Starbucks and Costa Coffee.⁵¹ These companies arrived in Britain in the late 1990s, a decade after the introduction of various fast food restaurants. Moran argues that these coffee chains “seek to retain the edgy, countercultural ambience of the traditional espresso bar,” although this does not always work out.⁵² Starbucks, for example, has many outspoken critics, including Moran himself who asserts that Starbucks has a “continental pretension, corporate blandness and vaguely progressive politics.”⁵³

Counter to the milk bars who were, according to Richard Hoggart’s observations, open to the working-class Juke Box Boys, global coffee chains exclude this same group.

⁴⁶ Joe Moran, “Milk Bars, Starbucks and the Uses of Literacy,” *Cultural Studies* 20, no. 6 (January 11, 2006): 566.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 555.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Joe Moran, “A Chav-Free Espresso, Please,” *New Statesman* 134, no. 4759 (September 26, 2005): 58–59, 58.

⁵⁰ Moran, “Milk Bars, Starbucks and the Uses of Literacy,” 556.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, 567.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

Due to the high prices of the drinks offered at such chains, less affluent people simply cannot afford buying coffee. The atmosphere created in these spaces only continue to reinforce this exclusivity. Starbucks is perhaps most well-known by most for its so-called “Seattle speak,”⁵⁴ which describes the names (mocha, latte, flat white) and sizes (tall, grande, venti) of the drinks in a unique language of its own.

This is not to say that all global chain restaurants in Britain have the same exclusivity. On the contrary, the recent emergence of more affordable chains such as McDonald’s has led the emergence of a new youth culture, known as the “Chav.”⁵⁵ A newer generation of the Juke Box Boy, Moran describes a Chav as a “designer-label obsessed, youthful member of the ‘peasant underclass.’”⁵⁶ The strong connection between Chavs and McDonald’s is especially visible through the website “Chavscum,” which depicts a version of the McDonald’s logo, with the slight logo alteration of “I’m lovin’ it” to “I’m chavin’ it.”⁵⁷ According to Moran, the connection between chav culture and McDonald’s is “symptomatic of [the Chav’s] vulgar appropriation of predominantly Americanized mass culture.”⁵⁸

There are striking parallels between Hoggart’s Juke Box Boys and the Chavs. Just as Juke Box Boys, the Chavs hang around in typical venues while they spend their money on commercial products of American origin. Chavs order cheap Big Macs and sit in the restaurants for hours, just as the Juke Box Boys ordered tea instead of the more expensive milkshakes just to be able to stay at the milk bars for hours.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, journalists and scholars who write about the Chavs today do not use the same harsh language Hoggart used when he described the Juke Box Boys’ behavior. Today, cultural literacy is not a common theme anymore.⁶⁰ Moran suggests that the reason for this is that Chav culture is not bound to a particular educational level or class background. Chavs do not necessarily have a working-class background like the Juke Box Boys. Instead, Chavs choose to belong to that specific culture regardless of their socio-economic background.⁶¹

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 567.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Moran, “A Chav-Free Espresso, Please,” 59.

⁶⁰ Moran, “Milk Bars, Starbucks and the Uses of Literacy,” 569.

⁶¹ Ibid.

Conclusion

Today, it is often difficult to distinguish Americanization from globalization. During the last decades, American culture has found its way into European societies. This was especially the case after the Second World War, when British society was confronted with elements of American culture that were brought to the island by American GIs who were stationed there. American music was as much deprecated by most adults as it was welcomed by teenagers. Alongside with music came juke boxes, American clothing styles and typical venues such as milk bars – ultimately, the American lifestyle was imported to the United Kingdom.

Richard Hoggart's observations of the Juke Box Boys leaves no doubt that he highly disapproves of American culture. He passes harsh judgment on the Juke Box Boys and claims that their degree of intelligence is below average. However, Hoggart has been rebutted by Joe Moran who explains that the milk bars were not even a solitary American invention. Joe Moran's approach to compare not only the youth cultures of the 1960s with the youth cultures of today but also their venues, turns out to be very interesting. While young men spent their leisure time listening to juke box music at milk bars in the 1960s, the milk bar's successors like Starbucks and Costa Coffee address a very different group of consumers nowadays. The drinks and the food offered at these coffee chains are simply too expensive for young working-class people. Instead, modern young people meet at American-based fast food restaurants, such as McDonald's, making these spaces the birthplaces of a new youth culture that Moran labels the Chav. Moran directly compares Chav culture to Hoggart's Juke Box Boys and comes to the conclusion that they are very similar to each other.

Overall, the assumption that British youth culture was, at least to a certain extent, influenced by American popular culture proves true not only for the 1960s, but even in today's global world, where Americanization often occurs under the guise of globalization. A globalized world makes it even easier for cultures to influence each other and the youth seems to be very susceptible for this influence. In this light, the question is what is going to be the next inspiration from the United States for teenagers or even the reason for the formation of a new youth culture.

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Atlantic Axes:**Testing Transatlantic Cooperation within the U.S.-EU-Cuba Triangle***Stefanie M. Schuster***Introduction: The Transatlantic Triangle/ El Triángulo Atlántico**

The origin of a triangular relationship between the Europe and the Americas stems from the start of colonization in the Americas. Even during the Spanish Empire, the United States deeply impacted Cuban life.¹ Eventually, “[t]his pervasive U.S. influence eroded Spanish colonial control and laid the cultural foundation for Cuba’s independence movement” while threatening José Martí’s vision of freedom and independence.² The country drifted into a war of independence, resulting in the US defeating the Spanish colonizers in 1898 and occupying Cuba until 1902.³ Afterwards, in exchange for independence, the United States added the Platt Amendment – a major curb to Cuban self-determination – to the Cuban Constitution.⁴ The year 1898 thus marked the beginning of “two external axes radiating from Cuba ... toward the United States and Spain.”⁵

The century-old triangle has distinct characteristics, as do the workings in its axes. By 2012, the EU had not established a common foreign policy toward any Latin American country besides Cuba.⁶ Based on its relevance for domestic and foreign affairs, Cuba qualifies as “an ‘intermestic’ issue in Spain and the United States and it receives a proportionately high level of attention considering its size and “the level of relations.”⁷ Why, then, is an issue of such concern not considered in the third axis between the United States and Europe? The axis between the U.S. and Europe is marked by “the deepest and most extensive bi-continental relationship in history.”⁸ A strong transatlantic relationship and Cuba’s importance for both the EU and the United States makes cooperation on Cuba a relevant topic.

¹ William M. Leogrande and Peter Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 8.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 9.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Susanne Grätius, “European Union Policy in the Cuba-U.S.-Spain Triangle,” eds. Jorge I. Domínguez, Rafael Hernández, and Lorena G. Barbería, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 127.

⁶ Ibid., 121. Reference point 2012, time of writing Grätius.

⁷ Ibid., 127.

⁸ Eduardo Perera Gómez, “The European Union and Its Role in U.S.-Cuban Relations,” eds. Jorge I. Domínguez, Rafael Hernández, and Lorena G. Barbería, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 100.

This paper evaluates opportunities for transatlantic cooperation in post-Cold War policy toward Cuba. It argues that these instances point to missed opportunities for United States and European Union (EU) cooperation on Cuba, with striking consequences. A cooperative imperative arises in the transatlantic axis of the triangle, a position that displaces much of Robert Kagan's 2002 argument on the lack of cooperative potential between the United States and Europe.

This study places the axes across the Atlantic between the United States, Cuba, and the EU.⁹ Watershed moments in U.S. and EU relations with Cuba in the last thirty years mark the time frame for this study. After the Cold War, there was "much more room for the development of relations," leading to more economic cooperation (and potential) between the EU and Cuba.¹⁰ First, the instances of 1996, the Helms Burton Act and the Common Position will be analyzed alongside each other. In 1996, both the United States and the European Union adopted decisive steps in their Cuba policies. Comparing these moves will show what they shared and where collaboration could have occurred. The second main chapter will study Cuba policy steps by the United States in 2014 and the European Union in 2016. These strategies mark a shift towards the normalization with Cuba in the United States and the EU, and may prove fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation. For the two sets of policies, goals, rhetoric, paradigms, and implications will reveal the connection between respective steps. The first three parameters shall highlight the strategies toward Cuba and display their compatibility, implications showcase policy meanings and help evaluate their effectiveness in cooperative opportunity. The paper studies official rhetoric in government sources without the intention of a value judgement. In the evaluation, the findings on cooperative opportunity between the United States and Europe will be tested against Robert Kagan's "Power and Weakness" and shall give insight into leadership in a multi-polar world.

Distance: 1996

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996

The description of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 reads that it aims "[t]o seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected

⁹ It is important to note that "[t]he EU is neither monolithic nor homogeneous" (Perera Gómez, "The European Union," 100) – neither are the other actors.

¹⁰ Gratius, "European Union Policy," 122.

government in Cuba, and for other purposes.”¹¹ Its explicit goal is thus to promote regime change and replace the Castro government. The “Sec. 3 Purposes” lists that the LIBERTAD Act (subsequently known as the Helms-Burton Act) is meant “(1) to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity [and] (2) to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government.”¹² Further, the protection of national security is a priority, listing both terrorism and immigration as examples.¹³ Another goal is “(4) to encourage ... free and fair democratic elections in Cuba” by creating a “(5) ... policy framework for United States support ... in response to the formation of a transition [or] democratically elected government in Cuba.”¹⁴

For the analysis on rhetoric and paradigms, only Titles I and II (Sec. 101 and Sec. 201) will be considered.¹⁵ Title I uses high-intensity vocabulary for the Castro regime: “its massive and extraordinary violations of human rights,” “the totalitarian Cuban Government,” “blackmail to unleash another wave of Cuban refugees,” “further depleting limited humanitarian and other resources of the United States.”¹⁶ This language reflects a high level of contempt for the Cuban revolutionary government and could itself be a potential obstacle for better relations. Title II, which is called “Assistance to a Free and Independent Cuba,” strikes a more supportive tone: “encourage the Cuban people to empower themselves,” “to support” “to facilitate,” and utilizes expressions like “[i]n solidarity with the Cuban people.”¹⁷ Values are expressed firmly: “the self-determination of the Cuban people is a sovereign and national right ... which must be exercised free of interference.”¹⁸ Overall, the sections strike an aggressive tone toward the Cuban regime and a more supportive tone for regime change and the Cuban population.

Cuba as a menace to the United States is the paradigm under Title I, which elaborates that there is a “threat to the national security posed by the operation of any nuclear facility, and the Castro government’s continuing blackmail to unleash another wave of Cuban refugees.”¹⁹ Mention of a general human rights violation appears only

¹¹ United States Congress. “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,” (Public Law 104–114, Washington, D. C., 1996), 10 STAT. 785.

¹² *Ibid.*, 785.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 788-789.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 789.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 791-792 and 805-806.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 791-792.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 805.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 792.

briefly and excludes any statement about democratic rights in the section calling for the “Strengthening [of] International Sanctions against the Castro Government.”²⁰ Under Title II, the guiding paradigms are democracy and the transition to this form of government, for which the Act lists multiple steps.²¹ There is no indication that these paradigms have been formulated in accordance with any other institutions; the United States thus likely established them unilaterally.

Implications in the policy text are broad, as the long list in sections 101 and 201 under Title I shows. It includes references to “the economic embargo,” and related steps such as the “[p]rohibition against indirect financing of Cuba,” “United States opposition to Cuban membership in international financial institutions” and political institutions, “[t]elevision broadcasting to Cuba,” the “expulsion of criminals from Cuba,” the “[a]uthorization of support for democratic and human rights groups and international observers,” and finally, the “[r]einstitution of family remittances and travel to Cuba.”²²

Title I demonstrates the relevance of these issues for the United States, even in their relations with other countries, noting that “any resumption of efforts by any independent state of the former Soviet Union to make operational any nuclear facilities in Cuba [targeting] the United States ... will have a detrimental impact on United States assistance.”²³

Title II holds an especially important implication: that the above democracy and transition paradigms become the condition for future engagement. This can be seen in its pledge to assist through the following steps:

(11) [A] transition government ... and a democratically elected government in Cuba ... (12) To be prepared to enter into negotiations ... (13) To consider the restoration of diplomatic recognition and support the reintegration of the Cuban Government into Inter-American organizations when the President determines that there exists [such a] government in Cuba. (14) To take steps to remove the economic embargo of Cuba when the President determines that

²⁰ Ibid., 791-792.

²¹ Ibid., 805-806.

²² Ibid., 785.

²³ Ibid., 792.

a transition to [such a government] has begun. ... (16) To pursue trade relations with a free, democratic, and independent Cuba.²⁴

Overall, rhetoric, paradigms, and the far-reaching scope of the sanctions emphasize the hegemonic position and self-perception of the United States.

Common Position of 2 December 1996

On December 2, 1996, the European Union set the “Common Position, a document aiming to encourage a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people.”²⁵ This objective aims at Cuban regime change through nonviolent measures.²⁶ Strikingly, the policy notes that it does not desire “change by coercive measures with the effect of increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people.”²⁷ The goal here is thus not to encourage regime collapse at the expense of the population, but to ensure a more democratic handing over of powers through facilitating “peaceful change in Cuba.”²⁸

The document’s rhetoric revolves around the sustainability of democracy. Calls for a regime change appear alongside assertions of “fundamental freedoms,” “respect for human rights,” “sustainable recovery,” and a “progressive and irreversible opening of the Cuban economy.”²⁹ The language hints at active rapprochement: “intensification of a constructive, result-oriented political dialogue,” “deepening of the dialogue with the Cuban authorities.”³⁰ The rhetoric seeks to appeal to democratic sustainability, as well as the future of relations and dialogue. Overall, the document employs a welcoming and active tone.

Paradigms largely relate to the rhetoric. Much emphasis is on human rights promotion, as well as democracy and cooperation based on the paradigms. Concrete policy measures in the Common Position include that “the European Union ... will intensify the present dialogue with the Cuban authorities and with all sectors of Cuban society in order to promote respect for human rights and real progress towards pluralist

²⁴ Ibid., 806.

²⁵ Council of the European Union, “Common Position of 2 December 1996” (96/6 97/CFSP, Brussels, 1996), Official Journal of the European Communities, L 322/1.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., L 322/2.

democracy.”³¹ Here, the guiding principle of human rights and democracy promotion is apparent. The second step reinforces commitment to this paradigm: “to remind the Cuban authorities, of fundamental responsibilities regarding human rights, in particular freedom of speech and association.”³² In the third step, again, the European Union vows to “encourage” legal change toward the same goals.³³ The Union intends to judge Cuba by “the same standards that apply to ... other countries, in particular the ratification and observance of international human rights conventions.”³⁴ Thus, the paradigms in EU relations apply to Cuba without exceptions. These expectations are relevant anytime, but “the European Union ... will remain willing ... through the Member States, to provide *ad hoc* humanitarian aid [and] carry out focused economic cooperation actions.”³⁵ This plan reveals both a double standard, as well as a compliance with value. The European Union would abstain from cooperation with Cuba referencing human rights and democracy-related issues, while individual member states would override this conviction and continue on with supportive or establish cooperative measures. At the same time, it speaks to the commitment to the living standards and the humanitarian situation if aid provision is continued and cooperative economic measures support “the economic opening being implemented.”³⁶ Hence, a lot of symbolic value is given to the paradigms and full European Union action.

Finally, the implications are paradigmatic conditions for cooperation. It is relayed that cooperation with Cuba is reliant on the country’s prioritization of democratic and human rights.³⁷ Cooperation does not only depend on compliance with EU values; rather, the EU promises to assist Cuba through helping to “examine the appropriate use of the means at its disposal for that purpose, including [for example] the intensification of cooperation and, in particular, economic cooperation.”³⁸ Effectively, bilateral trade between individual members and Cuba grew in the aftermath of the Common Position, highlighting the low impact of “bilateral political differences.”³⁹ The implications are

³¹ Ibid., L 322/1.

³² Ibid. L 322/1.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., L 322/1 - 322/2.

³⁹ Perera Gómez, “The European Union,” 105.

focused on a need for “dialogue with the Cuban authorities, through the appropriate instances, in order to explore further the possibilities for future negotiation of a Cooperation Agreement with Cuba.”⁴⁰ Overall, the EU establishes conditions for full cooperation, while highlighting opportunities for engagement. Hence, a future-oriented approach was put into place relying on Cuba to act on meeting the European standards which guided EU policy paradigmatically.

Proximity: 2014 & 2016

2014 Normalization of Relations with Cuba under U.S. President Obama

On December 17, 2014, President Barack Obama announced a policy change of relations with Cuba to the American public.⁴¹ The three major steps conveyed the goals of the new approach. The first step was to organize the re-instatement of diplomatic relations with Cuba after over fifty years.⁴² Obama referred to past success in cooperation and planned to collaborate on narco-trafficking, health and migration issues, as well as disaster aid to the benefit of both countries.⁴³ Here, structural goals of direct channels of communication and priorities such as human rights and democracy, for example, come together.⁴⁴ Further, Obama intended to increase efforts “to promote [U.S.] values through engagement.”⁴⁵ Step two and three would lower the impacts of sanction regimes on the island, while reconsidering the “designation as a State Sponsor of terrorism” can be interpreted as symbolic.⁴⁶ The other step foresaw an “increase [in] travel, commerce, and the flow of information to and from Cuba.”⁴⁷

It is worth reviewing regime change in Obama’s announcement. He pointed to the longevity of the Communist and Castro regime(s),⁴⁸ and seemed to regret the lack of change. Later, Obama elaborated:

[I]t does not serve America’s interests, or the Cuban people, to try to push Cuba toward collapse. ... We are calling on Cuba to unleash the potential of

⁴⁰ Council of the European Union, “Common Position of 2 December 1996,” L 322/2.

⁴¹ Barack Obama, The Obama White House, “President Obama Delivers a Statement on Cuba,” video recording, 00:03, see also 6:56 17 Dec. 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyw1iKif9Zs>.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 4:54.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 5:48.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 5:56.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 6:02.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 6:39.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 6:39.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 2:09.

11 million Cubans by ending unnecessary restrictions on their political, social, and economic activities. In that spirit, we should not allow U.S. sanctions to add to the burden of Cuban citizens that we seek to help.⁴⁹

These statements point to political and regime change through democratic reform. Obama finished explaining the policy steps with a disclaimer: lifting the embargo requires congressional approval, which is why Obama can only initiate a debate with lawmakers.⁵⁰ Obama emphasized a lack of further means to counter the embargo and thus previous Cuba Policy or, more specifically, the Helms-Burton Act.

Obama's rhetoric repeatedly puts "people" into focus. He "place[d] the interests of the people of both countries at the heart of [U.S.] policy."⁵¹ Also, he highlighted "[his] belief in the power of people-to-people engagement."⁵² The frequent use of "we" marks a cooperative rhetoric,⁵³ deviating from past policy briefs. Further tropes utilized are progress and change, and Obama announced the termination of "an outdated approach" and that "through a new policy engagement, [the United States] can ... help the Cuban people help themselves as they move into the 21st century."⁵⁴ Thus, "America chooses to cut loose the shackles of the past so as to reach for a better future" for both countries and the international community.⁵⁵ Here, however, progress and change appear as heavily associated with U. S. leadership in the hemisphere, which constitutes a return to hegemonic positioning.

The paradigms of the new approach revolve around citizen diplomacy. By making Cuba accessible for visitors, Obama notes that the Cuban people will be enfranchised through their exposure to American values.⁵⁶ Here, the intention is empowerment toward political participation. Thus, the paradigms of democracy promotion, citizen diplomacy and support for livelihoods are combined.

Implications of the policy are increased contact between leaders and citizens. In fact, diplomatic relations between the two countries were reinstated on July 20, 2015,

⁴⁹ Ibid., 10:43.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 8:17.

⁵¹ Ibid., 4:47.

⁵² Ibid., 6:52.

⁵³ See for example, Ibid., 5:12.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 0:10 and 0:14.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 14:35.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 6:55.

culminating in the installation of the U.S. embassy in Havana.⁵⁷ Cooperation with multiple actors appears as an implication in the announcement. Obama made clear that to “the Cuban people, America extends a hand of friendship.”⁵⁸ Obama follows this up by asking “fellow leaders to give meaning to the commitment to democracy and human rights at the heart of the Inter-American Charter.”⁵⁹ Implications or imperatives for the EU do not surface explicitly.

2016 EU Agreement with Cuba: Web Press Release and Video

In the 2016, the European Union and Cuba agreed upon an accord on political dialogue and trade cooperation.⁶⁰ The public can learn about the agreement with Cuba in a press release and a short video⁶¹ – both serve as sources here. The goals of the new policy were outlined by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who relayed that “[t]he EU is ready to support Cuba’s process of economic and social modernization.”⁶² According to this press release, the policy hopes to “promot[e] dialogue and cooperation to encourage sustainable development, democracy and human rights, and find shared solutions to global challenges.”⁶³ In sum, the goal is to engage in support for Cuba’s transition into a democratic and capitalist system, through cooperation. The video reaffirms the commitment to support human rights and democracy in Cuba, proclaiming that the EU will “modernise Cuba and make trade easier.”⁶⁴ “Modernise” is an ambiguous term and, given the context, may raise suspicion about regime and leadership change. Cooperation appears more explicitly: “on the fight against drugs and criminality,” “on cultural heritage” and “on social development.”⁶⁵

⁵⁷ Embassy of the United States of America Havana, Cuba, “Re-establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Cuba” (press release statement, Havana, 2015), n. pag.

⁵⁸ Obama, “President Obama Delivers a Statement on Cuba,” 11:24.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 13:00.

⁶⁰ Press Office – General Secretariat of the Council, European Union, “EU-Cuba: Council Opens New Chapter in Relations,” Press Release Statement, 6 Dec. 2016, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/06/eu-cuba-relations/>.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Federica Mogherini in Ibid. Emphasis dropped.

⁶³ Press Office, “EU-Cuba: Council Opens New Chapter in Relations,” 2016.

⁶⁴ Press Office – General Secretariat of the Council, European Union, “The EU Seals a New Agreement with Cuba,” 0:23, 0:31, Video on Press Release, 6 Dec 2016, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/06/eu-cuba-relations/>.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 0:39, 0:48, 0:51.

The rhetoric in the press statement is generally collaborative, repeatedly referring to “dialogue” and a desire for “a closer and more constructive partnership” with Cuba.⁶⁶ Change is another trope in the rhetoric. The statement celebrates the policy as “the first ever agreement between the EU and Cuba,”⁶⁷ which Mogherini describes as “a turning point in the relations between the EU and Cuba.”⁶⁸ Overall, the rhetoric frames the agreement as positive change and emphasizes its collaborative dimension. The addition of the video, a rhetorical device itself, underlines the celebratory character of the message. It does not feature voice content, but text banners on picturesque backgrounds.⁶⁹ The language is quite basic, with no official statements or details, unlike the press statement.⁷⁰ The upbeat guitar tunes along with images from the island or joint flags reproduce the celebratory character. The messaging of the video and statement, however, share the same focus.

The paradigms in the press statement relate to the goals and rhetoric. The format of the video positions people as the focal point. In fact, with the exception of the introduction and ending frame, the footage displays people on the island, constituting half of the 1:31-minute video.⁷¹ Change is also extended as a paradigm. One of the banners reads, “The new agreement opens up new perspectives on both sides.”⁷² Here, exchange adds to change. It explains individual policy steps: “Cuba is prone to natural disasters and affected by climate change. The EU will help making the island less vulnerable to droughts and storms.”⁷³ In this scene, a person is walking toward a building in a rainy storm and within the paradigm of people, the video refers to student exchange programs through Erasmus Mundus.⁷⁴ Thus, the video forwards a shifted the set of paradigms, employing the means available to the media format.

From the press statement, implications revolve largely around goals. The agreement states that it “foresees an enhanced political dialogue, improved bilateral

⁶⁶ Mogherini in Press Office, “EU-Cuba: Council Opens,” 2016. Emphasis dropped.

⁶⁷ Press Office, “EU-Cuba: Council Opens,” 2016.

⁶⁸ Mogherini in Ibid. Emphasis dropped.

⁶⁹ Press Office, “The EU Seals,” 1:31, Video on Press Release, 6 Dec 2016, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/06/eu-cuba-relations/>.

⁷⁰ Press Office, “EU-Cuba: Council Opens,” 2016.

⁷¹ Ibid., 0:30-1:16.

⁷² Ibid., 1:20.

⁷³ Ibid., 0:58.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 1:00 and 1:09.

cooperation and the development of joint action in multilateral fora.”⁷⁵ Strikingly though, it explicitly “repealed the EU 1996 Common Position on Cuba,”⁷⁶ which, given the lack of conditions for engagement in the press statement, would have to be void after this agreement. Hence, the EU and Cuba cooperate openly in the new framework. The video highlights the breadth of the agreement. Community, especially around issues like climate change, reappears: The “new perspectives” it opens up, are “on both sides of the Atlantic,”⁷⁷ both in Cuba and Europe. In a broader interpretation, this transatlantic imperative could target the entire triangle.

Missed Chances, Collaboration and Power in the Transatlantic Triangle

The background of the Common Position was the adoption of the Helms-Burton Act and the Clinton Presidency.⁷⁸ The findings show important parallels: The goal of regime change in Helms-Burton resembles the Common Position, in which values were more in the foreground. Remarkably, the EU saw the option of a “peaceful” change started by the government.⁷⁹ Also, the Common Position excludes burdening the population, the biggest difference in the two approaches: The Helms-Burton Act, included the “strengthening [of] international sanctions”⁸⁰ In fact, it became part of the sanctions regime against Cuba, which had already been in place for almost fifty years, and enshrined sanctions against Cuba into law.⁸¹ Amnesty International found the embargo’s negative consequences for “the economic and social rights of the Cuban population, affecting in particular the most vulnerable sectors of society.”⁸² One of the organization’s examples involves trade and financing restrictions, which curb import of medical supplies of different kinds including up-to-date technologies. The lack of these imports affects treatment of fatal conditions and the state of public health services.⁸³ Increasingly, the international community is becoming aware of the obligation to reflect on the impact of

⁷⁵ Press Office, “EU-Cuba: Council Opens,” 2016.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Press Office, “The EU Seals,” 1:20.

⁷⁸ Perera Gómez, “The European Union,” 114.

⁷⁹ Council of the European Union, “Common Position of 2 December 1996” L 322/1.

⁸⁰ United States Congress, “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,” 785.

⁸¹ Amnesty International, “The US Embargo against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights,” Sept. 2009, 5, 7, 10, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr25/007/2009/en/>.

⁸² Ibid., 5.

⁸³ Ibid., 5-6.

punishment regimes on livelihoods.⁸⁴ By adopting Helms-Burton, the United States tightened an existing sanctions regime with far-reaching effects on Cuban lives.

The EU carefully voiced its opposition and pursued a more tentative approach, as the rhetoric shows; while the United States used strong vocabulary of contempt for the Cuban regime, the EU communicated more sustainably and involved. The paradigms in both policies are democracy promotion. Here, the United States emphasized threat, while the EU focused on Cuba and the human rights situation. Policy implications involve the human and social rights impacts of the policy, as well. The comprehensiveness of the embargo strongly affects Cuban life, as Amnesty International showed. Both policies introduce conditions for engagement. Compared to the United States, the European Union followed a non-coercive, more future-oriented approach, hopeful for a smooth transition on the island.

The mid-2010 strategies foresaw rapprochements with Cuba. Obama announced engagement with regime change appears more subtly, but he was firm on the opposition to “try[ing] to push Cuba towards collapse,” which he admitted, had been unsuccessful in the last half century.⁸⁵ Here, Obama gave away the objective of the embargo: depriving the island of the basis for existence. The EU, on the other hand, communicated that its policy would support a process of change on the island through engagement. Rhetoric and implications of the Obama policy revolve around people and exchange. The EU very similarly emphasizes dialogue through a celebratory tone focused on change and exchange. Implications on either side are the development of community around the new exchanges and the unconditional, multi-faceted cooperation in the case of the EU. All these new channels of engagement may imply change in mindsets and enable “new perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic.”⁸⁶ Here, all parameters show high congruency and compatibility. The largest difference lies in available strategies based on previous policies. The EU was free to negotiate an agreement with Cuba, while Obama was only able to announce steps within his executive power.⁸⁷ Aside from goals, the transatlantic axis is a community – one that can be a powerful agent in promoting shared values through cooperation. The centrality of people in both strategies is especially important

⁸⁴ Ibid. 6.

⁸⁵ Obama White House, “President Obama Delivers a Statement on Cuba”, 10:43.

⁸⁶ Press Office, “The EU Seals,” 1:20.

⁸⁷ Obama White House, “President Obama Delivers a Statement on Cuba,” 8:18.

common ground, providing an imperative for cooperation. The 2014/2016 developments reflect the missed opportunity from before and consequences for the present.

Conclusion: The Transatlantic Axis in the Triangle -

Contextualizing “Power and Weakness”

Neither the U.S. nor EU engaged the parallels in their axis to their own advantage as political actors. Rather, they missed an opportunity in 1996 with unfortunate consequences, and setbacks in Cuba policy are still apparent today. An agreement with Cuba puts the EU one step ahead of the United States. This study found that similar priorities would have enabled cooperation on Cuba policy. This notion of common ground fundamentally challenges Robert Kagan’s argument in “Power and Weakness,” in which he claimed that “on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less.”⁸⁸ Particularly in topics such as democracy and citizen engagement, the United States and Europe did not fundamentally disagree, but simply did not pursue the same strategy to implement these paradigms into policy.

By “Power and Weakness,” Kagan means relative capability: “When the United States was weak, it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness; ... When the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and material glory. Now, they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers.”⁸⁹ Establishing European weakness based on capability in the global system offers a reductive view of global influence. While it remains true that militarily, the EU is not as powerful as the United States. Kagan’s view that “Americans are idealists, but they have no experience of promoting ideals successfully without power,”⁹⁰ is confirmed here: the United States chose a coercive strategy based on a relatively comfortable position of power in the hemisphere. Europe, conversely, relied on the soft power toolkit of European integration: patient and gradual diplomatic and economic engagement, along with incentives for participating in a non-zero-sum game.⁹¹ Ultimately, this strategy proved successful in reaching an agreement with Cuba, which speaks to European negotiating power.

⁸⁸ Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” *Policy Review* June & July (2002), 3.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

For the future, Kagan recommends that “[i]f the United States could move past the anxiety engendered by this inaccurate sense of constraint, it could begin to show more understanding for the sensibilities of others, a little generosity of spirit.”⁹² This would have been a good starting point for the crafting of a sanctions regime and cooperation with Europe, which would have likely spared the Cuban population from harm. Kagan even contends: “[A]fter all, it is more than a cliché that the United States and Europe share a set of common Western beliefs. Their aspirations for humanity are much the same, even if their vast disparity of power has now put them in very different places.”⁹³ These “different places” do not point to unbridgeable differences, though. Within their goals, “[the] two opposite visions [for regime transition] find common ground in criticism of the human rights situation and especially freedom of expression and association.”⁹⁴ It is here, where opportunity for cooperation opened in the past and will in the future. Both visions for the future include engagement, as Gratius confirms. The Union’s background on “dialogue and negotiation,” as well as life on Cuba gives it leverage against the United States.⁹⁵ This strength in soft power that ultimately defeats Kagan’s argument and provides an important imperative to the United States to cooperate with the European Union.

⁹² Ibid., 28.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Gratius, “European Union Policy in the Cuba-U.S.-Spain Triangle,” 136.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 137.

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Creating Frenemies from Friends: The Impact of the Post-World War II/Cold War Order on the US-EU Relationship

Victoria Salemme

Introduction

A single, post–World War II global order was never possible. The order envisioned at the end of World War II was that the winners of the conflict would serve as the benevolent guardians of peace, institutionalized through inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations.¹ However, the reality of a multi-polar system post-WWII put a strain on this idealistic outcome, instead favoring a global order of spheres of influence dominated through military strength and economic supremacy.² Thus, the spirit of liberal internationalism was de facto replaced by a system with two parties competing for world dominance: the Cold War.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent end of the Cold War, many hoped the post-World War II vision would be resurrected. However, as the multi-polar world order made way for a unipolar, hegemonic system, let by the US, the world order became one instead informed by years of showing unquestioned strength, militarily and economically, as well as decisive leadership. In turn, this has led to conflict today between the hegemon, the US, and its main allies in the European Union.³ In part this is because out from under the constant threat of the Soviet Union (USSR) and after rebuilding economically, the EU’s vision of a Kantian world seems possible to them. With the exception that the opinion of the US and EU individually on how a nation should ‘behave’ in the international theater has become incongruent, in turn creating a transatlantic drift. This has culminated into the present state of the US-EU relationship, one in which the two entities are not on the proverbial ‘same page.’

This bears asking: how did these allies get here, and will these persisting rising tensions permanently damage the long-standing and generally positive US-EU relationship? Recently, these questions are on the forefront of the minds of many transatlantic relations scholars, some of whom believe the drift is natural because the

¹ “Yalta Conference Agreement, Declaration of a Liberated Europe,” conclusion date: February 11, 1945, *National Archives*, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116176>.

² United States History, “Franklin D. Roosevelt,” United States History, accessed March 09, 2019, <https://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1578.html>.

³ In reference to Western EU states, who have been allies to the US in the past. Specifically using Germany as an example.

divide was inevitable, due to overstating the ‘common view’ of the world held by the US and EU. Robert Kagan, went so far as to famously say, “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus,” reasoning that they do not see eye-to-eye on much and understand one another less and less. Therefore, he believes a seamless relationship is nearly impossible.⁴ Other notable scholars who pose similar arguments to Kagan are Geir Lundestad, Philip H. Gordon, and Steven Everts.⁵ Not all scholars, however, are so pessimistic. Many argue that while there are problems between the two entities, they are not insurmountable because there still is enough commonality to secure a close future relationship, going as far as to make recommendations on how to re-secure said relationship. Scholars that prescribe to this idea include Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Rory Kinane, Martin Quencez, Xenia Wickett,⁶ Frank-Walter Steinmeier,⁷ and Jan Techau.⁸ At the heart of these discussions, the main counterpoints of fundamental interest lie: what has caused this drift, to what extent will the rift affect relations, and what will be the lasting implications?

To enhance the discussion, this work will argue that differing developmental influences during the post-World War II / Cold War era have produced the conditions the US and EU are now experiencing: namely, a prevalent schism focused on national interests, a difference in the position each holds in the international theater, and opposing fundamental beliefs in how power should be used. In examining these key points, this essay will analyze the key factors creating tension and in doing so try to formulate an answer as to how deep the rift goes and what the lasting affect could be. It is important to

⁴ Robert Kagan. “Power and Weakness,” *Policy Review* 113, no. 1 (June 2002): 3, www.policyreview.org/JUN02/Kagan.html.

⁵ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford:Oxford University Press on Demand, 2005).; Philip H. Gordon, "Bridging the Atlantic Divide," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no.1 (January/February 2003): 70-83.; Steven Everts. “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?: Managing Divergence in Transatlantic Foreign Policy,” (Working Paper, Centre for European Reform, February 2001), <https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/working-paper/2001/unilateral-america-lightweight-europe-managing-divergence-tr>.

⁶ Alexandra De Hoop Scheffer, Roy Kinane, Martin Quencez, and Xenia Wickett, “The Future of U.S. Global Leadership Implications for Europe, Canada and Transatlantic Cooperation,” (Policy Paper, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, May 9, 2016), <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/future-us-global-leadership-implications-europe-canada-and-transatlantic-cooperation>.

⁷ Frank-Walter Steinmeier, "Germany's New Global Role: Berlin Steps Up," *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 4 (July/August 2016):106-113. Frank-Walter Steinmeier is the current German President, former Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs to Germany.

⁸ Jan Techau, “The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe,” (Paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2, 2015), <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/09/02/politics-of-2-percent-nato-and-security-vacuum-in-europe-pub-61139>. Jan Techau is a political scientist.

continue this discussion especially now that the US, under the Trump administration, is undergoing a major change in position, creating additional pressure on the already fragile US-EU relationship.⁹ As these tensions rise, so too do global challenges such as immigration crises, technological security breaches, terrorism, and the rising power of Russia and China, all of which could lead to more substantial issues. Therefore, this is a critical time to evaluate these relationships so that it can better be understood if this revamped idea of ‘America First’ will, in fact, become ‘America Alone,’ and whether Europe is prepared to assume greater responsibilities in a subsequent pull-back from the US.¹⁰

To fully review these topics, this paper will explore some of the ideas expressed by scholars in the field and will work to identify and discuss the foremost areas from which the tension stems. The work is thus divided in three distinct sections. The national interests of each entity are examined and compared in the first section. The second section addresses the position of each entity in the international arena and how this affects their interests and constraints. Finally, the paper examines the power politics of each entity to determine how the fundamental differences in how power is utilized has caused, and continues to cause, tension. While these three areas may not encompass all the topics surrounding the corrosion of the US-EU relationship, they do represent the larger areas of fundamental difference. Twenty-eight member nations make up the EU, so it is not possible to examine each one in the scope of this essay. Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, Germany is used as the representative of the EU. The choice of using Germany as the main representative is because “Germany is increasingly regarded as a key player in Europe,” to the extent that some scholars argue that Germany is the key player in EU politics, due to its position as the European country with the largest population and economy.¹¹ Narrowing the analysis to Germany and the US is beneficial to this discussion because it is easier to compare nation-to-nation than nation to a collective group of nations. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that German opinions and actions do

⁹ Thomas Wright, *A Post-American Europe and the Future of U.S. Strategy* (Brookings Institution: The New Geopolitics, 2017),

https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/fp_20171205_post_american_europe.pdf.

¹⁰ Amanda Sloat, “Dispatch from Munich: The Trans-Atlantic Rift Persists amid Weaknesses on Both Sides,” Brookings, February 18, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/18/dispatch-from-munich-the-trans-atlantic-rift-persists-amid-weaknesses-on-both-sides/>.

¹¹ Angela Merkel and Ursula Von Der Leyen, “White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr,” White Paper, The Federal Government of Germany, July 13, 2016, 22.

not necessarily reflect all EU member states and, as such, this work is limited in creating larger generalizations. Even so, it will analyze the current US-EU relationship while arguing that it is due to divergent national interests, differing positions in the international theater, and opposing fundamental beliefs in how power should be used – shaped by the post-WWII / Cold War era – that the US and EU find themselves today on opposite sides of the international conversation.

National Interests Diverge

National interest is what a nation feels it must achieve to secure itself and its own well-being; thus, nations generally always engage in the process of fulfilling or securing their national interest goals. Consequently, each nation formulates its foreign policy because of its national interest in upholding national security. Thus a nation will always try to justify its actions on a basis of national interest and security. Hence, it is essential to examine the national interests of the US and Germany as first steps in determining where tensions arise.

In many ways, the strategic interests of the US have remained static since the beginning of the post-WWII / Cold War era, despite a changing world. Though many Americans and scholars see this lack of evolution as restrictive, the US continues to rely on these fundamental strategies to protect itself and advance its interests. This is troublesome because it is limiting and non-adaptive, which is a main reason why relations with allies are becoming strained. These goals are focused on the US and are what makes its success possible. For example, US national interest point (2)¹² made by De Hoop Scheffer et al. in their article “The Future of U.S. Global Leadership Implications for Europe, Canada and Transatlantic Cooperation” almost screams ‘America First.’ It is perhaps the most problematic in that the US wants to ensure its allies survival solely so that they can do the bidding for the U.S.¹³ This points to the international order during

¹² The main national interests of the US, as specified by De Hoop Scheffer et al., “The Future of U.S. Global Leadership Implications for Europe, Canada and Transatlantic Cooperation,” are: (1) Prevent, deter and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons attacks on the US or its military forces abroad; (2) Ensure US allies’ survival and their active cooperation with the US in shaping an international system in which we can thrive; (3) Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on US borders; (4) Ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment); and (5) Establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nationals that could become strategic adversaries, [such as] China and Russia

¹³ De Hoop Scheffer et al., “The Future of U.S. Global Leadership Implications for Europe, Canada and Transatlantic Cooperation,” 2-3.

the post-World War II / Cold War era, in which the US was the leading partner in Europe, assisting its allies with rebuilding to prevent the spread of communism and bolster its own success. Furthermore, the lack of adjustment to policy and outlook is troublesome in that it does not leave room for equal partnerships, which is problematic as the EU rises in power. This is perhaps one explanation as to why the US has a propensity for wanting to engage the world in unilateral action. Historically, the US has had the latitude to work alone, resulting in its relationship with other nations as dependents rather than peers.

In comparison, while some of Germany's national interests echo the same aspects stated by the US, there is a fundamental difference in the definition of national security. The main variance is that Germany seeks larger cooperation between other nations, emphasizing global responsibility and cooperation. This is so Germany can help ensure the long-term safety and success of a world vision of collective and perpetual peace. German national interests points (2), (3), (5), and (6),¹⁴ as specified in the 2016 Bundeswehr White Papers, best show the divergence of Germany's national goals from those of the US by depicting Germany's commitment to the larger community and loyalty to its allies,¹⁵ and showing that German interests generally consider the interests of the collective in informing its decision. The development of these German policies reflects an adaptation to the changing world and a recognition that individual interests can be better achieved multilaterally. This flexibility and universal outlook can be ascribed to the re-development of European countries during the post-World War II / Cold War Era. During this period, European countries had to work collectively to begin to prosper again.

Kagan, however, argues that the united evolution of Europe is the fundamental problem in European thinking because their rebirth was under a "mantle of the US security guarantee."¹⁶ The fact that the EU reformed under this outsourced security has led to the notion that "American military power, and the strategic culture that has created and sustained it, are outmoded and dangerous," when in actuality it is only because the

¹⁴ The key points of national interests as spelled out in the 2016 Bundeswehr White Papers are: (1) Protecting our citizens as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country; (2) Protecting the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and the citizens of our allies; (3) Maintaining the rules-based international order on the basis of international law; (4) Ensuring prosperity for our citizens through a strong German economy as well as free and unimpeded world trade; (5) Promoting the responsible use of limited goods and scarce resources throughout the world; and (6) Deepening European integration and consolidating the transatlantic partnership.

¹⁵ Merkel and Von Der Leyen, "White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr," 25.

¹⁶ Kagan, "Power and Weakness," 3.

US provided security from outside that it was rendered “unnecessary for Europe’s government to provide it.”¹⁷ Thus, Kagan argues that American power made it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important.¹⁸ Gordon echoes this idea, stating that the creation of NATO and the collective defense agreement absolved Europeans from having to think about security beyond its borders. This is because “global military strategy was something to be handled primarily by the US, leaving Europeans to focus on the difficult task of building their unprecedented zone of internal peace and prosperity.”¹⁹ This key developmental ‘flaw’ has perhaps led to current tensions as a result of this paradoxical division of national interests where the US is responsible for the security interest for both its allies and itself. Thus, this allows Europeans to focus on secondary security interests such as global warming because they do not have to worry about the primary.²⁰ Accordingly, it seems history has created a modern day reality where the US and EU have two diverging attitudes towards national interest, which was created due to the different pressures each faced during the post-WWII / Cold War era.

Position in World Theater Determines Action

This leads to the second topic, which relates to the ‘position’ of each state in the international arena and how that has affected how global issues are handled. It is widely acknowledged by political theorists that the post-Cold War international system is unipolar, with the US serving as the reigning hegemon due to its record GDP and its military capability.²¹ In “The Lonely Superpower,” Samuel P. Huntington states:

The United States [...] is the sole state with preeminence in every domain of power—economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological and cultural—with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world.²²

In the same vein, Germany is one of the world’s largest economies and has taken a leading

¹⁷ Ibid., 24.

¹⁸ In this specific situation, the reference to “power” refers to the principle of “hard power,” also seen as military power.

¹⁹ Gordon, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide,” 74.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Alternatively, as Samuel P. Huntington noted, “it is instead a strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major powers. The settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states; the single superpower can, however, veto action on key issues by combinations of other states.” (Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no.2 (March/April 1999): 36.

²² Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no.2 (March/April 1999): 36.

position in EU affairs with the largest population out of all EU member states. Nevertheless, as current German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier²³ states, “Germans should not exaggerate their country’s progress. Germany has not become a ... superpower...Germany has merely held its ground better than most.”²⁴ Huntington would argue that this places Germany at a secondary level as a “major regional power that [is] preeminent in [its area] of the world without being able to extend [its] interests and capabilities as globally as the United [State’s].”²⁵ Thus, this variance in global significance lies at the heart of the disparity between these two nations. While both represent leaders globally and regionally, there is the fundamental issue of scale, not only of physical size, but also effectuality, capability, and influence – in sum what makes a superpower ‘super.’ The difference is of a principal factor to rising tensions because, while Germany is a great nation and an international player, Germany does not carry the same inherent responsibilities and dangers as the US hegemon.

The events of September 11 and subsequent War on Terror are clear examples of this tension. In each of their works, Huntington and Kagan assert that Iraq and other “rogue” states do not objectively pose the same level of threat to Europeans as they do to the US. Kagan hypothesizes that “Europeans [...] believe they may be secondary targets—because they are allied with the US—but they are not the primary target.”²⁶ This lesser fear of being targeted stems from the prevalent American security guarantee that Europeans have enjoyed for six decades. Kagan, Evert, and Lundestad each further support this argument, noting that if the EU was in trouble the US would be expected to protect the EU.²⁷ This is partly due to the historical pre-text “of the two world wars [which] had shown that the US would intervene to prevent Western Europe from falling under the control of a hostile power,” and later during the Cold War, where the US used NATO to protect the EU from the USSR.²⁸ Furthermore, this supports that the US has a larger scope of responsibility far surpassing its physical borders, and has taken upon itself

²³ Frank-Walter Steinmeier also served as the Foreign Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Germany.

²⁴ Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Germany's New Global Role: Berlin Steps Up,” *Foreign Affairs* 95: no. 4 (July/August 2016):106-113.

²⁵ Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” 36.

²⁶ Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” 15.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 16; Everts, “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?,” 70-83.; Geir Lundestad, “Transatlantic Drift: The Present and the Future,” in *The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford:Oxford University Press on Demand, 2005), 269-332.

²⁸ Lundestad, “Transatlantic Drift,” 267.

the “burden of maintaining order in far flung regions of the world,” including the EU as well as areas from “which European power has largely withdrawn.”²⁹ It even can be argued that the so-dubbed “American Empire” has become the new borders that the US must defend to protect its interests. Germany, meanwhile, can be more flexible due to the nation’s limited responsibilities.

Furthermore, logically the position of the US as the hegemon, with immense hard and soft power capabilities leaves the US a greater target than most. Kagan alludes to this when he states “it is precisely America’s great power [and global reach] that makes it the primary target, and often the only target.”³⁰ Lundestad reiterates this idea in his article, “Transatlantic Drift: The Present and the Future,” noting that it is because America is uniquely powerful that it is particularly vulnerable, and that it is this vulnerability that drives the US to dominate the international arena, seeing things in absolutes or zero-sum security situations. This is connected to the arguments in the previous section, which noted that the different position of the US in the international arena necessitates the US to have a greater national interest in security.

The fundamental differences in responsibility and threat, which affect the global role each nation plays, are factors contributing to the political strain. If one entity cannot understand what constitutes and creates the circumstances of another country, it becomes difficult for the entity understand the position and results in disapproval of the other nation. In order to overcome this drift in transatlantic relations caused by the divergent international positions, “many analysts and practitioners of foreign policy propose to rebalance the relationship [between the US and EU] and transform it into a real global partnership.”³¹ This is especially important because as some scholars argue, “the international system is [already] moving towards a multipolar order.”³² However, if the EU cannot meet the obligations that are required to equalize the partnership, then the rift might continue to grow. Lundestad codified this into terms of “military dependence,” saying that so long as the EU depends on the US for its security, the two entities cannot be equal.³³ However, notwithstanding the attraction of this idea of a global partnership,

²⁹ Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” 14.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Everts, “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?,” 17.

³² Angela Merkel and Ursula Von Der Leyen, “White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr,” White Paper, The Federal Government of Germany, July 13, 2016, 30.

³³ Lundestad, “Transatlantic Drift,” 267.

there are still a number of problems due to the reality that Europe and America significantly disagree on what in today's world constitutes a serious problem.

How Should Power Be Used and What Justifies It

Perhaps one of the most critical sources for tension between the US and EU is the use of power in terms of military force because of its ethical nature. Normally in international relations, there are two fundamental forms of power: hard power, namely military force and coercion, which is often the most obvious manifestation of power; and soft power, which is 'force' exerted by other means, such as through diplomacy, international laws and regulations, sanctions, culture, and influence. In many ways, the US is seen as a state that relies heavily on hard power to meet its goals, while the EU, specifically Germany, is more likely to encourage and use forms of soft power. In this relationship, the basic outline is that the US resorts to force more quickly because, as mentioned, the US definition of security is much more absolutist than the European one. It is therefore understandable why the US tends towards hard power, as America's military capabilities are immense. Germany, in contrast, prefers to utilize diplomatic means of resolution and tools of persuasion to achieve its goals, with military action being a last resort.³⁴ In part, this is because they are more limited militarily than the US, so the EU emphasizes the options readily available: diplomatic negotiation and economic instruments focused heavily on transparency and interdependence to meet their ends.³⁵ President Steinmeier explained this posture by stating that "as a reflective power, Germany [...] will resort to military engagement only after weighing every risk and every possible alternative."³⁶ Thus, in approach to military force, the US and EU are on different sides of the argument.

Arguably, these approaches derive from each entity's post-World War II / Cold War experience. Regarding the US, much of its foreign policy goals still are defined by its previous experiences, so it is fair to assume that its developmental processes in handling international affairs has followed suit. During the Cold War, the US had to rely on its military capabilities and strength to achieve its ideals of containment. Thus, while the USSR threat does not exist anymore, this learned behavior of seeing things in stark terms remains, leaving a powerful US with enormous freedom of action throughout the

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Robert Cooper, "Robert Cooper: The New Liberal Imperialism," *The Guardian*, April 07, 2002, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/07/1>.

³⁶ Steinmeier, "Germany's New Global Role: Berlin Steps Up."

world and with little pressing desire or need to adopt new mechanisms, including the use of soft power.³⁷ This is especially true when considering that the post-WWII / Cold War era pattern allowed the US to be successful.

On the other hand, developing under the NATO initiated auspice that the military power of the US would protect Germany and the EU meant, and continues to mean, that the EU never had to develop extreme military measures.³⁸ This created a circumstance in which Europeans “are most worried about issues [...] that have a greater chance of being solved by political engagement and huge sums of money.”³⁹ In part, this is because Europeans have become accustomed to the idea of living in an “international community” and accept the constraints of their sovereignty, especially as they lack alternative means to achieve their goals.⁴⁰ In other words, Europeans focus on issues where European strength come into play, but not on the ‘threats’ where European weakness makes solutions elusive.⁴¹ It is therefore not surprising that smaller and weaker countries on a crowded continent are more interested in (and find it easier to live with) the use of soft power than the world’s superpower.⁴² It can also be drawn from this comparison that “Europe’s relative lack of military power compared to that of the US is as much the product as it is the cause of the two sides’ different strategic cultures”⁴³ because Europe’s relative lack of interest in developing military power is one of the perverse consequences of the US historically focusing on hard power as a solution.

This brings back the main explanation – that it was during the post-World War II / Cold War era that each nation developed. During this period, the US positioned itself as the military hegemon and the EU accepted its protection, creating military weakness that have now produced important and sometimes serious disagreements on how international affairs should best be handled. This ‘power gap’ identified by Kagan is certainly a factor.⁴⁴ It is only natural to expect that a country with the capacity of the US be inclined to try to fix problems whereas countries with fewer such resources at their disposal, such as Germany, try to manage them. As Philip Gordon expounds, “[t]he US’ vast military

³⁷ Gordon, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide,” 74.

³⁸ Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” 13.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Gordon, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide,” 74.

⁴¹ Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” 13.

⁴² Gordon, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide,” 74.

⁴³ Ibid., 73.

⁴⁴ Kagan, “Power and Weakness.”

power, technological prowess, and history of unparalleled accomplishment have imbued Americans with a sense of ‘can-do’ optimism about the world that contrasts starkly with the relative pessimism known in Europe.”⁴⁵ Therefore, US power, combined with a lower tolerance for vulnerability, leads Americans to be far more ready than Europeans to take action against threats, even on a unilateral basis. For these reasons, it is clear as to why there has been a rise in tensions; as each entity has divergent strengths and weaknesses, resulting in different and conflicting approaches to resolve issues.

Conclusion

Today, the US and Europe Union are both struggling to provide global leadership when it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and shaping and implementing foreign and defense policies. This essay discussed how the post-WWII / Cold War reality created differing approaches and how these differences are at the root of the transatlantic divide today. Regarding national interest, it seems there is a difference in opinion that it is due to different philosophies developed over time. The rigidity of the US has prevented it from adapting to a changing world and limits its ability to move away from self-serving policies and creating balanced and equal partnerships. Alternatively, the EU’s dependence on the US in this era has created somewhat idealistic views that do not necessarily fit with realities of today’s global world. Additionally, a lack of cohesion on pressures, responsibilities, and threat levels due to still differing global views and positions also has created strain. It is difficult for the US or EU to compromise with one another because there are fundamentally different security issues and responsibilities that each holds and must factor into how they achieve their interests. Finally, the differences in the use of power come from a system set up during this era that has placed the brunt of the responsibility on the US while the EU again is left to deal with issues in its own way. Fundamentally, each entity utilizes what it knows about the world to inform its decisions, but these divergent conditions result in the creation of tension. This is especially important today with a current US president who seems, at best, indifferent to Europe’s fate, causing continental European leaders and policymakers to recognize that they may have to rely on themselves. German Chancellor Angela Merkel summed up the feelings of many while speaking at an election campaign event when she said:

⁴⁵ Gordon, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide,” 73.

The times in which we could totally rely on others are to some extent over, as I have experienced in the past few days. We Europeans really must take our fate into our own hands.⁴⁶

Merkel's message is clear: Europe no longer can count on the US; but for all their differences, US and European values and interests in the world remain highly similar and an amicable relationship still exists.

The rift between these two entities will only continue to grow if not addressed, so to maintain alliance cohesion, both sides need to be prepared to make changes. On the side of the US, it needs to be more open to further conversation, transparency, and cooperation. Additionally, the US needs to become accustomed to the changing international system, be more adaptive, and take more advantage of the strengths of its allies, as well as redefine relationships to ensure equal partnerships with entities. Conversely, the EU needs to step up financially and politically to use the full spectrum of foreign policy tools. For example, there needs to be more effort in achieving the goals of reaching the 2 percent of GDP expenditure for military defense, since, as mentioned, relations with the US can never truly be equal unless the EU assumes control of its own defense. Furthermore, the EU needs to provide some latitude to its strict ideals on the use of force. With more cooperation, understanding, patience, and open lines of communication, the US and EU will once again find common ground. If action is not taken though, relations will continue to erode to a point of no return.

Future scholars should look at ways these entities can build more commonality. Much of the literature discussed here speaks to existing problems without regard to presenting solutions as this paper endeavors, but still a clear, multilateral framework to work towards has yet to be outlined. More review of this subject area will benefit the academic discussion and help to influence actual policy in the future. This is an important conversation since both the US and the EU share common Western beliefs, leading to fundamental similarly aspirations for humanity, despite their diverging courses of development during the post-WWII / Cold War era. The divide needs to be addressed sooner rather than later, so that the current and escalating tensions do not lead to a transatlantic divorce.

⁴⁶ BBC News, "Merkel: Europe Must Take Fate in Hands," BBC News video, 00:41, May 28, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-40078188/merkel-europe-must-take-fate-in-hands>.

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